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A mong the most remarkable changes in the labor markets of high-income nations during the past century have been the rise in the female workforce and the narrowing of gender gaps in schooling and earnings. At the same 
time, government mandates and firm policies regarding families expanded. In some 
instances, legislation was preceded by great economic change, as when the spread 
of industrialization in the 19th century led to calls for restrictions on female work. 
Other legislation resulted from social and political change, as occurred during the 
women’s movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Demographic change also played a role 
as nations have sought to address declining fertility or when dictatorships desired to 
increase population. By the early 21st century, most high-income countries have put 
into effect a host of generous and virtually gender-neutral parental leave policies 
and family benefits, with the multiple goals of gender equity, higher fertility, and 
child development. 
What have been the effects? Proponents typically emphasize the contribution 
of family policies to the goals of gender equity and child development, enabling 
women to combine careers and motherhood, and altering social norms regarding 
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gender roles. Opponents often warn that family policies may become a long-term 
hindrance to women’s careers because of the loss of work experience and the higher 
costs to employers that hire women of childbearing age.
Understanding the causal impact of family policies on gender outcomes has 
faced two main challenges. First, family legislation is complex. Parental leave can 
vary in length, job protection, income support, and availability to either parent. 
The rules and costs governing preschool education and child care vary considerably 
across countries. Some countries have enabled direct family transfers and tax allow-
ances to low-income working parents, differing in rules and magnitudes. Recent 
and increasingly common mandates include a legal right to part-time work and 
flexible working time. A further complication is that policies should not be analyzed 
in isolation. If a nation passes longer parental leave entitlements, the effects will be 
determined in part by benefit coverage during leave and the cost and availability of 
childcare services once leave entitlements expire. 
A second challenge is determining cause-and-effect relationships. For example, 
the evolution of social norms towards more egalitarian gender roles may induce 
both family legislation and higher female labor force participation. An empir-
ical approach that attributes the entire increase in female participation to the 
passage of the legislation will overstate its impact. 
Existing research has tackled these issues at both the country and the indi-
vidual levels. The country-level approach captures the impacts of policies based on 
between- and within-country variation in intervention, exploiting internationally 
consistent data on a variety of labor market outcomes. This approach has the advan-
tage of considering an array of policy interventions and interdependencies among 
them, as well as general equilibrium effects of the policies. But such measurement 
is invariably coarse and the identification of the causal impacts of interest can be 
problematic. Because we will show some estimates based on country-level data, we 
will need to emphasize these limitations throughout our discussion.
The micro-level approach evaluates the causal impact of specific policies 
within a country by combining rich microdata with variation from natural experi-
ments, such as the lengthening of leave policy or the provision of paid leave. The 
approach generally considers just one policy intervention at a time, but detailed 
characterization of the institutional environment can allow for more meaningful 
comparisons.
We draw lessons here from existing work and our own analysis on the effects 
of parental leave and other interventions aimed at aiding families. The outcomes 
of interest are female employment, gender gaps in earnings, and fertility. We begin 
with a discussion of the historical introduction of family policies ever since the end 
of the nineteenth century and then turn to the details regarding family policies 
currently in effect across high-income nations. We sketch a framework concerning 
the effects of family policy to motivate our country- and micro-level evidence on the 
impact of family policies on gender outcomes. Most estimates range from negligible 
to a small positive impact. But the verdict is far more positive for the beneficial 
impact of spending on early education and child care.
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Historical Background
While all developed countries now have in place some form of parental leave 
policy and family transfers, the path to policy adoption has differed widely across 
countries, in terms of both its timing and political rationale. In the mid-19th 
century, early efforts to regulate working conditions in industrialized (or industri-
alizing) countries often encompassed special provisions for female work. Britain 
and Switzerland pioneered this movement by introducing specific restrictions on 
female work shifts since the 1840s. Starting around mid-19th century, virtually all 
US states gradually adopted legislation on maximum weekly hours for women, and 
most western economies restricted the employment of married women in general 
or in specific professions. Later in the century, Germany, Sweden, Austria, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Denmark, and Switzerland introduced explicit regulations for 
(mostly unpaid) maternity leave, followed by France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, 
and Greece in the early 20th century.1
The emphasis in early legislation was mostly phrased in terms of protecting 
physically weaker workers from extreme working conditions, and concerns for 
the health of mothers and children typically led to bans on female employment 
within a few weeks of birth. Mandated leave was only sporadically accompanied by 
job protection or income support. Unions often latched onto such special provi-
sions for women in order to lobby for a shorter workweek for men (Goldin 1988). 
In 1919, the International Labour Organization advocated maternal rights to 12 
weeks’ leave from work around the time of birth, combined with job protection and 
partial income support. While maternal leave was ratified in most member coun-
tries, job and income protections did not become the norm until much later in the 
20th century.2
In the 1950s, the design of family policies across Europe emphasized tradi-
tional gender roles, and explicitly protected women in their capacities as wives 
and mothers. During World War II, women in countries with high rates of male 
military mobilization filled jobs in male-dominated sectors like manufacturing, 
transportation, and military industry. Despite these developments—or sometimes 
as a response to them—family policy legislation in some European countries often 
seemed designed to reaffirm women’s household roles. For example, some coun-
tries extended job leave rights without granting job protection (Ruhm 1998, and 
references therein), which can be interpreted as encouraging women to take leave, 
while raising uncertainty about the ability to return to work in a similar position. 
The late 1960s and 1970s brought important changes in maternity leave provi-
sions and set the basis for a wider selection of modern family policies. The sharp 
rise in female labor market participation generated greater demands for maternity 
1 See Wilkander, Kessler-Harris, and Lewis (1995).
2 In Appendix Table A1, available online with this paper at http://e-jep.org, we report a summary of early 
legislation based on a comparative study published by the US Department of Labor Children’s Bureau 
(Harris 1919). 
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leave provisions as a way to reconcile careers and motherhood. Countries that 
had adopted maternity leave earlier often extended these provisions substantially, 
while other countries like Canada and Australia introduced such provisions. Most 
high-income countries combined leave periods with job protection and increased 
income support during employment breaks. Sweden was the first country to intro-
duce explicit paternity leave rights in 1974, allowing mother and father to share six 
months of parental leave. Other European countries started to supplement “mater-
nity leave,” available to mothers around the time of childbirth, with “parental leave,” 
available to both parents during a child’s early years (as reported in the OECD 
Family Database “PF 2.5 Annex: detail of change in parental leave by country”). 
These changes, together with the decline in the manufacturing sector and the weak-
ening of trade unions, contributed to eroding the male breadwinner model in most 
high-income countries.
The United States notably lagged behind these general trends. Back in 1919, 
the Children’s Bureau published a comparative study of “Maternity Benefit System 
in Certain Foreign Countries” (Harris 1919), which stated that the report was 
commissioned “in the hope that the information might prove useful to the people 
of one of the few great countries which as yet have no system of State or national 
assistance in maternity—the United States.” Despite having in place equal pay legis-
lation since 1963, and maternity leave legislation in a few states starting in the late 
1960s, the only maternity provision adopted at the federal level until the 1990s was 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, prohibiting unequal treatment of preg-
nant women. Parental leave rights were introduced in the United States with the 
passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, allowing eligible employees up 
to 12 weeks of unpaid leave for pregnancy and newborn care. A major selling point 
emphasized by its proponents was its claimed beneficial impact—beyond mothers’ 
welfare and careers—on child development, reduced abortions, and men’s access to 
leave (Anthony 2008). Opposition was driven to a large extent by its perceived costs 
to employers. Currently 25 states, most notably California, have more generous 
parental leave provisions than the federal law.
In 1996, the EU Directive on Parental Leave ratified rights to at least three 
months of parental leave for childcare purposes, over and above maternity leave 
rights, seeking to “facilitate the reconciliation of parental and professional respon-
sibilities for working parents.” The EU Directive also encouraged member states to 
limit transferability of each parent’s rights across parents, so as to achieve a more 
equal participation of parents in child care. The 2010 Parental Leave Directive 
further extended leave rights to four months. Pronatal motives often underpinned 
the recent waves of parental leave and other family policy reforms, aiming to remedy 
the the problem of birth rates falling below replacement levels and demographic 
aging in several European countries (Raute 2015).
While maternity or parental leave has historically been the most impor-
tant dimension of family policies, the introduction of leave rights has often been 
followed, with long and varying lags, by other family-friendly policies such as public 
or subsidized child care, workplace practices such as part-time work or flexible 
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working time, and in-work benefits for parents. The rationale behind these policies 
was often to encourage fertility while limiting the career penalty of motherhood. 
Family Policies in High-Income Countries
At present, all high-income industrialized countries have in place paid mater-
nity leave rights (with the exception of the United States where this is unpaid), 
and provide some support, in cash or kind, for child care. Table 1 provides a snap-
shot of some key family policies in a recent cross-section of developed economies, 
including the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, and 11 large European coun-
tries. All indicators reported are obtained from the OECD Family Database and 
Social Expenditure Database and refer to the latest available year, between 2011 
and 2015.3
Countries are organized in decreasing order of duration of job-protected leave 
provisions for mothers, which is reported in column 1. This includes maternity 
leave and the maximum job-protected parental leave available to mothers for home 
care of children, whether or not income support is also included. For simplicity we 
will refer to this variable as “parental leave.” The median parental leave is about 
60 weeks, with very wide variation across countries, summarized by a standard 
deviation of about one year. Germany, France, Spain, and Finland have leave entitle-
ments above three years, followed by Norway and Sweden with around 20 months 
of entitlement. At the other extreme, the United States has 12 weeks of parental 
leave. While this figure refers to federal entitlements, 25 US states have expanded in 
some way or another upon federal legislation. Interestingly, cross-country variation 
in parental leave rights is much wider than in other labor market institutions such as 
the unemployment benefit replacement ratio and the tax wedge—and, as we discuss 
later, wider than in gender employment outcomes.4 
Variation in maternity leave provisions around the time of childbirth, shown in 
column 2, is modest in comparison, with most countries ranging between 14 and 
22 weeks. As shown in column 3, on average about one-third of this must be taken 
before birth. The bans that some countries have on working during late pregnancy 
are likely a vestige of early legislation, from a time when a larger share of jobs, like 
many manufacturing jobs of the past, were physically strenuous.
3 Table A2, available in the online Appendix to this paper at http://e-jep.org, reports this information 
for a larger sample of 30 OECD countries. 
4 The cross-country coefficient of variation in the length of parental leave is between two and three times 
the coefficient of variation in the unemployment benefit replacement ratio or the tax wedge (indicators 
from OECD Benefit and Wages data, http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages-statistics.htm, and 
Tax Wedge data, https://data.oecd.org/tax/tax-wedge.htm, 2014). While leave entitlements are a good 
predictor of the percentage of employed women who are on leave during the first year after birth, 
representing a measure of their take-up rate, the corresponding correlation (measured on 18 countries 
for which data on take-up is available) is only 0.44.
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Table 1 
Cross-country Variation in Family-Friendly Policies 
Maximum 
job-
protected 
leave for 
mothers 
(weeks)
Total 
maternity 
leave 
(weeks)
Pre-birth 
leave (% 
maternity 
leave)
Total 
paid leave 
available 
to mothers 
(weeks) 
Average 
payment rate 
for mothers 
(% of average, 
2014, national 
earnings)
Total paid leave 
available 
to father 
(% total 
paid leave
for both parents)
Early 
childhood 
education 
and care 
(% GDP) 
Accumulate 
days off and 
vary start/
end of daily 
work (% 
companies)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Spain 166 16 63 16 100 12 0.6 34.07
France 162 16 38 42/110a 44.7 40/33a 1.2 54.29
Germany 162 14 43 58 73.4 13 0.5 62.00
Finland 161.03 17.5 29 161.03 26.5  5 1.1 86.05
Norway 91 13 23 91 50.0 10 1.2 —
Sweden 85 15.6 45 60 63.4 14 1.6 74.18
United Kingdom 70 52 21 39 31.3  5 1.1 46.83
Greece 60.33 43 19 43 53.9  1 0.1 20.60
Japan 58 14 43 58 61.6 47 0.4 —
Australia 52 6 100 18 42.0 10 0.6 —
Canada 52 17 47 52 52.6  0 0.2 —
Denmark 50 18 22 50 54.1  4 2.0 76.91
Italy 47.7 21.7 18 47.7 52.7  0 0.6 39.96
Netherlands 42 16 38 16 100  2 0.9 66.48
United States 12 0 0 0 0  0 0.4 —
Sources: Columns (1) to (5): OECD, Family Database, Public policies for families and children (PF), 
indicator “PF2.5 Trends in parental leave policies since 1970.” Column (6): OECD, Family Database, 
Public policies for families and children (PF), indicator “PF2.1 Key characteristics of parental leave 
systems.” Column (7): OECD, Social Expenditure database “PF3.1 Public spending on childcare and 
early education, in percentage of GDP” (December 2014). Column (8): OECD Family database—The 
labour market position of families (LMF), indicator “LMF2.4 Family-friendly workplace practices based 
on European Company Survey, 2013.” See http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm and www.
oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm. 
Notes: Column (1): Maximum number of weeks of employment-protected parental leave available to 
mothers, regardless of income support. This is the sum of weeks of maternity leave, parental leave, and 
home care of children. Column (2): Total number of weeks of maternity leave available to employed 
women, regardless of income support. These are defined as employment-protected leaves of absence 
for employed women around the time of childbirth, or adoption (in some countries). Column (3): 
Percentage of total weeks of maternity leave that a woman is allowed to take before the expected date 
of childbirth. Column (4): Total number of weeks for which a mother can receive payments from the 
benefit attached to or associated with parental leave, regardless of the period of employment protection. 
Column (5): Number of weeks of paid leave reserved for the exclusive use of the father, divided by the 
sum of weeks of paid leave for the exclusive use of the father and weeks of paid leave available to mothers. 
(6): The “average payment rate” is the proportion of previous earnings replaced by the benefit over the 
length of the paid leave entitlement for a person earning 100% of average national (2014) earnings. If 
this covers more than one period of leave at two different payment rates, a weighted average is calculated 
based on the length of each period. Column (7): Government spending in early childhood education 
and care measured as the sum of benefits in cash and kind, in percentage of GDP (see online Appendix 
for details). Column (8): Percentage of companies in the European Company Survey (administered 
by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Condition, Eurofound) that 
report providing the possibility to accumulate hours for days off (full or half days) and to vary the start 
and end of daily work to at least some employees. Sample period: latest year available. This is 2015 for 
columns (1) to (6), 2011 in column (7), and 2013 in column (8). 
a  In columns (4) and (5), we report two statistics for France. The first number refers to families with one 
child, the second to families with two children.
Claudia Olivetti and Barbara Petrongolo     211
In all countries except the United States, a substantial portion of parental leave 
is paid, as shown in column 4. Leave benefits are usually funded by a combination of 
social insurance systems and employee and employer social security contributions. 
The proportion of previous earnings replaced by maternity benefits is on average 
52 percent, based on 2014 country-specific average earnings, as shown in column 5. 
According to column 6, paid leave entitlement for fathers is on average 11 percent 
of total paid entitlement per household. Wherever parental leave is available, enti-
tlement is not entirely transferable between parents (for details, see OECD 2016). 
Column 7 reports data on public expenditure on early childhood and educa-
tional care, in cash or kind (or, for brevity, “early childhood spending”). This is 
on average 0.8 percent of country-specific GDP, but up to 2 percent in Denmark, 
and above 1 percent in the rest of Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, and France. 
North American and Southern EU countries have the lowest rates of early child-
hood public spending. In the United States, early childhood public spending is 0.4 
percent of GDP. 
The final column of Table 1 reports an indicator of work time flexibility, which 
is only available for EU member states. On average, 56 percent of firms across EU 
countries offer employees the opportunity to accumulate days off and to vary the 
start and end of daily work. This proportion falls below 40 percent in southern 
Europe and rises above 75 percent in Scandinavia. 
In comparing family policies in Table 1, it’s important to bear in mind that the 
introduction of parental leave rights and family-related subsidies has often been 
accompanied by or has followed changes in a country’s social norms and attitudes 
towards gender roles in the home and the market. For example, while family policy 
legislation in the post–World War II period reflected the role of women as primary 
providers of child and home care, women’s movements of the late 1960s contributed 
to introducing the first elements of equal parental treatment in family intervention. 
In reality, different countries may be adopting, say, generous parental leave out of 
quite different motivations, and it would not be clear a priori whether this is more 
in line with paternalistic considerations of protecting the “weak” or goals of gender 
equality.5 
To give an example, women in Denmark and Italy have very similar entitle-
ment to parental leave around 50 weeks, with nearly identical replacement ratios. 
However, maternity leave extensions in Italy happened mostly before the 1960s, with 
long mandatory absence periods before and after birth, especially in manufacturing 
and agriculture, and no provisions for fathers. In Denmark, the bulk of parental 
leave legislation came into play after 1960, during decades of rapidly evolving 
social norms, and with limited substitutability between maternal and paternal leave 
rights. Comparable maternal leave rights are currently coexisting with relatively 
5 Previous work has shown that countries with more conservative gender norms exhibit lower female 
employment rates, higher gender gaps in college education, and disproportionately lower marriage rates 
for highly educated women (among others, see Fortin 2005; Bertrand, Cortes, Olivetti, and Pan 2016). 
However, less is known about how family policies correlate to such norms.
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gender-biased norms in Italy—where, according to the European Values Survey, 70 
percent of the population agree or strongly agree with the statement “Pre-school 
children suffer from a working mother,” but with much more gender-neutral 
attitudes in Denmark—where only 10 percent of the population agree with that 
statement. In fact, cross-country evidence does not reveal any clear-cut association 
between the generosity of parental leave and answers to gender-related survey ques-
tions.6 However, countries with more conservative views on men and women’s roles 
in society tend to spend less on early childhood education and child care, and are 
less likely to accommodate flexible working arrangements. 
Framework
Most family policies are intended to encourage female labor supply. For 
example, subsidized child care seeks to provide direct substitutes for maternal child 
care. Maternity leave seeks to enable mothers to stay attached to the labor market 
during temporary interruptions of employment, while retaining firm-specific or 
occupation-specific human capital. Similar arguments can be made for flexible or 
part-time work arrangements. However, extended maternity leave may have detri-
mental effects on female labor supply in the long run if it induces women to stay out 
of work for long enough periods, or repeated periods, in a way that hinders them 
from effectively re-entering employment on the same pre-maternity track.
Besides these first-order impacts on labor supply, family policies may feed into 
labor demand decisions via at least two channels. On the one hand, insofar as part 
of the costs of these arrangements directly or indirectly trickles down on employers, 
the demand for female labor (and especially for women of child-bearing age) 
would be negatively affected. On the other side, if family policies effectively make 
continuity of employment for mothers easier, and their enhanced labor market 
attachment is incorporated into employers’ beliefs, the extent of statistical discrimi-
nation (if any) against women would be reduced, with beneficial effects on labor 
demand for women.
In a competitive labor market with imperfect substitution of inputs, the change 
in the gender wage ratio as a result of family policies is theoretically ambiguous, 
depending on the relative shifts in labor supply and labor demand and the context 
in which such shifts occur. For example, if equal pay legislation effectively prevents a 
fall in female wages, then policies that would raise the cost of hiring women may lead 
to a fall in female employment at constant wages. Similar effects are to be expected 
in the presence of union contracts or binding minimum wages. In most countries 
considered, collective wage negotiations set gender-neutral, industry-specific wage 
6 In Table A3 of the online Appendix, we show bilateral correlations between each policy indicator 
reported in Table 1 and several qualitative measures of gender norms from the World Values Survey and 
the European Values Study. 
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floors. If such floors are above equilibrium wages, most of the effect of family legisla-
tion would show up in gender differences in employment rates. 
The case of in-work government benefits for lower-wage workers is different, as 
it implies an increase in female labor supply, at no extra cost for employers, leading 
to an increase in employment and a fall in wages paid by employers to such workers 
(unless such wages are sticky downward). 
If the labor market is not perfectly competitive—for instance, due to job 
search frictions and imperfect labor mobility—policies that ease continuity of job-
to-worker relationships could be especially valuable in allowing women to retain 
their match-specific search capital after childbirth. In this setting, firms would have 
a degree of monopsony power and workers would be paid below their marginal 
product, according to the wage elasticity of labor supply to the individual employer 
(Manning 2003). In this case, the costs of family policies may be absorbed by the 
wedge between the wage and the marginal product without a detrimental impact 
on female employment. In particular, Manning (2003, chap. 7) argues that, 
because women with domestic responsibilities may be relatively more restricted in 
commuting time, hours of work, and other nonwage attributes, their labor supply 
to the individual firm may be less wage-elastic than male labor supply, implying a 
higher wedge for women than for men.
In summary, the introduction of family policies might be expected to lead 
to an increase in female employment and possibly a fall in female relative wages, 
depending on wage elasticities of labor demand and supply. As these elasticities may 
vary with skill, age, and family composition of women, the effects of policy interven-
tion may be heterogeneous along these and other dimensions. Wage effects may 
be mitigated or even reversed whenever continuous labor market attachment or 
labor market experience is highly valuable, as in the presence of search frictions, 
high returns to actual labor market experience, and feedback mechanisms onto 
employers’ beliefs. On the other hand, theories of gender statistical discrimination 
suggest that these policies might backfire by reinforcing employers’ beliefs and 
social norms regarding women’s comparative advantage in child care and home 
production more generally. 
Cross-Country Evidence
Given wide international variation in family policies, several papers have 
compared institutions and gender labor market outcomes across high-income 
OECD countries. In a prominent early study, Ruhm (1998) examined the effect 
of parental leave on female employment and wages during 1969–1993 in nine EU 
countries that experienced significant changes in their respective leave mandates. 
His analysis indicates that short periods of paid entitlement around three months 
lead to a 3 to 4 percent rise in female employment rates, with little effect on wages, 
while longer entitlements of more than nine months lead to negligible additional 
impact on employment but sizeable negative impacts of about 3 percent on female 
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wages. Such employment effects can be generated by stronger labor market attach-
ment during job-protected leave and the right of mothers to return to pre-birth 
jobs, as well as entitlement effects for women who would not otherwise participate 
in the labor force but intend to accumulate work experience to later qualify for 
leave benefits. Detrimental wage effects after long periods of absence may be driven 
by loss of actual labor market experience, as well as by nonwage costs to firms such as 
disruption and replacement costs. Given the employment effects of leave, changes 
in wages may also result from the outward shifts in female labor supply and/or selec-
tion effects on the composition of female employment.
There are caveats to a causal interpretation of these results, duly noted by 
Ruhm (1998). In particular, the estimates overstate the true impact of leave rights 
insofar as their extension is accompanied by the implementation of other family-
friendly policies, such as subsidized child care. Furthermore, female labor supply 
shifts may create political support for parental leave rights and lead simultaneously 
to both extended rights and higher female employment rates.
The general approach in Ruhm (1998) has been extended by later work to 
cover more recent years, a wider set of countries, and a richer set of institutions. 
Thévenon and Solaz (2012) broadly confirm Ruhm’s findings on a cross-section of 
30 countries observed between 1970 and 2010. Using data on a sample of 17 high-
income OECD countries for 1990–2010, Blau and Kahn (2013) find that gender 
gaps in both employment and wages shrink with parental leave rights, the generosity 
of benefits, the right of part-time work, and equal treatment legislation (although 
only the effects of the latter two are statistically significant). The authors conclude 
that the greater expansion of these policies outside the United States is an impor-
tant factor explaining why female employment growth in the United States has been 
weaker relative to these other OECD countries since the early 1990s. Cipollone, 
Patacchini, and Vallanti (2014) find evidence of heterogeneous policy effects by 
showing that female participation of medium- and highly-educated women is more 
responsive to family-oriented policies—as measured by a synthetic index encom-
passing parental leave, family subsidies, and elderly subsidies—than participation 
of less-educated women.
A few papers have exploited the staggered introduction of parental leave rights 
across geographies within a country. Baum (2003) focuses on the partial state-level 
adoption of leave rights in the United States ahead of the Family and Medical Leave 
Act in 1993, and fails to detect any significant impact of leave rights on employ-
ment or wages of mothers. Using a similar approach, Han, Ruhm, Waldfogel, and 
Washbrook (2009) detect detrimental employment effects of parental leave and 
welfare benefits, and positive effects of childcare spending, for single mothers and 
the less-skilled. Baker and Milligan (2008) find that the introduction of leave rights 
in Canadian provinces delays return to work of mothers shortly after birth, but eases 
return to the pre-birth employer.
Below we complement existing cross-country evidence by bringing together 
data on 30 countries that are currently in the OECD. Figure 1 summarizes evidence 
on female employment in these countries since the 1970s (or the 1980s wherever 
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earlier data are not available). The employment rate is measured as the number 
of individuals aged 25–54 who are employed, divided by the relevant population. 
Countries are ranked in ascending order of female employment in the 2010s, 
ranging from 28 percent in Turkey to 79 percent in Iceland. The average female 
employment rate in the sample is currently 60 percent, with a standard deviation of 
10 percent. The US female employment rate of 62 percent is just above the sample 
average. Scandinavian countries rank towards the top of the chart, followed by most 
English-speaking countries, while southern European countries and lower-income 
countries rank towards the bottom. In relative terms, there is much wider variation 
in parental leave rights across these countries than in female employment. In most 
countries, female employment has increased in recent decades, from 49 percent 
on average in the 1980s to 60 percent in the 2010s. However, there is no evidence 
of narrowing differences in female employment across countries. Until the 1990s, 
the female employment rate in the United States was among the highest in this 
sample of countries, but it actually declined since then, from about 66 percent in 
the 1990s to about 62 percent in the 2010s, and now ranks very close to the sample 
median. 
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Evolution of Female Employment Rates: 1970s to 2010s
Sources: OECD Employment Database 2016, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LFS_
SEXAGE_I_R.
Notes: The figure reports average employment rates for women aged 25–54, by decade. The employed 
are defined as those who work for pay or profit for at least one hour a week, or who have a job but are 
temporarily not at work due to illness, leave, or industrial action. We report data since the 1970s or the 
earliest available decade.
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Data on labor market institutions and outcomes are brought together in 
Table 2, in which six family policies are considered. The four columns show four 
different outcomes: the female employment rate; the gender gap in employment, 
measured by the male–female difference in employment rates; the gender wage 
gap, computed as the log of the ratio between median earnings of working age 
men and women for full-time employees; and the total fertility rate, defined as the 
total number of children that would be born to each woman throughout her child-
bearing years. The table reports raw correlations between such average outcomes 
for 2010–2014, and the family policy indicators reported in Table 1. 
Table 2 
Correlations between Family-Friendly Policies and Women’s Outcomes 
(coefficients in bold are statistically significant)
 
Female 
Employment 
Rate
Gender 
Gap
Total 
Fertility 
RateEmployment Earnings
Maximum weeks of job-protected leave 0.188 –0.385 –0.134 –0.472
 available to mothers (0.320) (0.036) (0.482) (0.009)
30 30 30 30
Total paid leave available to mothers (weeks) 0.205 –0.320 0.018 –0.372
(0.278) (0.085) (0.925) (0.043)
30 30 30 30
Average payment rate, mothers –0.103 0.175 –0.108 –0.134
 (% average earnings) (0.590) (0.355) (0.570) (0.480)
30 30 30 30
Total paid leave available to fathers 0.151 –0.034 0.298 –0.129
 (% total paid leave) (0.426) (0.859) (0.110)  (0.496)
30 30 30 30
Early childhood education and care (% GDP) 0.513 –0.466 –0.153 0.396
(0.004) (0.009) (0.419) (0.030)
30 30 30 30
Accumulate days off and vary start/end of 0.735 –0.657 0.275 0.195
 daily work (% companies) (0.000) (0.001) (0.228) (0.396)
21 21 21 21
Sources: OECD (2016) Employment Database, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LFS_
SEXAGE_I_R. OECD, 2016, Gender wage gap (indicator). doi: 10.1787/7cee77aa-en. OECD (2016), 
Fertility rates (indicator). DOI: 10.1787/8272fb01-en.
Notes: For each institution/outcome combination, we report the correlation coefficient, its p -value 
(in parentheses), and the number of observations. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at 
conventional levels. The employment rate by gender refers to the number of individuals aged 25–54 who 
are employed, divided by the relevant population. The employed are defined as those who work for pay 
or profit for at least one hour a week, or who have a job but are temporarily not at work due to illness, 
leave, or industrial action. The gender gap in employment is the male–female difference in employment 
rates. The wage gap is computed as the log of the gender ratio between median earnings of working 
age men and women. Data on earnings are for full-time employees. The total fertility rate is defined as 
the total number of children that would be born to each woman if she were to live to the end of her 
childbearing years and give birth to children in alignment with the prevailing age-specific fertility rates. 
See notes to Table 1 for sources and definition of family-friendly policies indicators. Sample period: all 
outcomes are 2010–2014 averages. 
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The first two policy choices, maximum weeks of leave available to mothers and 
total paid leave available to mothers, have a negative, statistically significant correla-
tion with the gender gap in employment. These correlations are overall robust, by 
which we mean that they are not driven by any small subset of countries in particular, 
as it can be grasped visually in Figure 2, which plots the gender gap in employment 
rates against the maximum weeks of job-protected leave available to mothers. The 
length and financial coverage of parental leave are also negatively correlated to 
the rate of fertility, but such correlations are entirely driven by the presence of the 
four eastern European countries in our sample, that are characterized by record 
low fertility and generous leave provisions. If one removes Poland, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Slovakia from this sample, the correlation between the fertility rate 
and the length of parental leave becomes small and statistically insignificant.
The next two policy choices—the average payment to mothers as a share of 
average earnings, and paid leave to fathers—are not significantly associated with any 
of the outcome variables. The final two policy choices, spending on early childhood 
care and the index of workplace flexibility, are positively correlated with female 
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Figure 2 
Employment Gap and Maximum Length of Job-Protected Leave for Mothers
Source: OECD Employment Database, 2016, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LFS_
SEXAGE_I_R. OECD, Family Database, Public policies for families and children (PF), indicator “PF2.5. 
Trends in parental leave policies since 1970,” 2016. 
Note: The figure plots the gender gap in employment rates (as defined in Table 2) against the maximum 
weeks of job-protected leave available to mothers for the countries in our sample.
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employment and negatively correlated with the employment gap. These correla-
tions are very strongly significant and robust to the exclusion of (small) geographic 
clusters of countries. Spending on early childhood care is the only one of these poli-
cies to have a positive (and robust) correlation with the fertility rate. None of the 
policy variables are significantly correlated with the gender earnings gap. 
We have explored the various correlations further, looking at different groups 
of women. When we differentiate relevant outcomes across three skill groups—
below secondary education, secondary education, and tertiary education—the 
results show that only for the less-skilled are female relative earnings higher in 
countries with flexible working arrangements. On the other hand, correlations with 
employment outcomes are consistent across the skill distribution.7
Of course, variation in parental leave may itself induce mechanical variation in 
measured employment rates, as the employment count includes individuals at work 
in a reference week as well as those who were temporarily absent from work, and 
parental leave is among named reasons for such temporary absence. Thus an indi-
vidual who is not working t months after childbirth may be classified as “employed” 
in a country with leave entitlement longer than t, and “nonemployed” in a country 
with shorter entitlement, despite performing the same activity in the two contexts. 
Comparing ILO employment rates to employment rates obtained by classifying 
as “nonemployed” any individual temporarily absent from work due to parental 
leave, we find that female employment rates would be on average 2 percentage 
points lower with the second definition of employment status—ranging between 
3.3 percentage points in Austria and Scandinavian countries, to virtually zero in the 
United States.8
We next look at the impact of family policies on gender outcomes exploiting 
their evolution over time, and controlling for country and year fixed-effects—while 
bearing in mind the caveats to a causal interpretation of coefficients expressed 
above. The results are reported in Table 3, which considers the same four outcomes 
as in Table 2: the female employment rate, the gender gap in employment and 
earnings, and the total fertility rate. For each outcome, we use two alternative 
specifications. The first specification (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7) only controls for the 
maximum job-protected leave and its square, allowing for nonlinearities in the 
effect of parental leave on various outcomes as in Ruhm (1998). The second speci-
fication also controls for the percentage of the total leave that is income-protected, 
the average replacement ratio, and the percentage of GDP that is spent on early 
7 For details of these additional correlations, see Table A5 of the online Appendix. 
8 Specifically, we compare male and female ILO employment rates to employment rates obtained by clas-
sifying as “nonemployed” any individual temporarily absent from work due to parental leave. We can only 
perform this exercise for countries covered by the Eurostat Labor Force Survey and the United States, 
based on the Current Population Survey. For this subsample of countries (23 out of 30), the correlations 
with the set of institutions in Table 2 do not change with the employment definition. In contrast to the 
result for women, mentioned above, excluding workers on parental leave barely alters male employ-
ment rates, with the exception of Iceland and Sweden, with relatively generous paternity leave provisions 
and high take-up rates. For details, see Table A4 in the online Appendix, in which countries are sorted 
according to the discrepancy between the two alternative employment measures for women. 
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years education and care. While it is important to control for other family policies, 
as well as parental leave, because of possible correlation between their timings of 
introduction, one should bear in mind that this reduces our sample size by about 
one-third, as the average replacement ratio is not available for eight countries in 
our sample.9
9 These are: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, and Turkey. The 
replacement ratio data for 1970–2010 are obtained from the Max Planck Institute for 22 countries, while 
OECD data on replacement ratios are only available for 2015. If one drops the replacement rate from the 
regressions while still controlling for the percentage of parental leave that is income-protected and early 
childhood spending, the estimated effect of parental results is very similar to the one obtained when 
parental leave is the only included regressor.
Table 3 
Family-Friendly Policies and Women’s Outcomes
 Female employment rate Employment gap Earnings gap Fertility rate
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Maximum weeks of 0.113*** 0.063** –0.050*** 0.023 –0.011 –0.210*** 0.002 –0.001
 job-protected leave (0.019) (0.029) (0.018) (0.022) (0.033) (0.033) (0.001) (0.001)
Maximum weeks –0.078*** –0.062*** 0.043*** 0.012 0.016 0.108*** 0.001 0.001**
 squared/100 (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.001) (0.001)
Percentage of total –0.037*** 0.029*** 0.006 0.002***
 leave that is paid (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.000)
Average payment rate –0.036*** 0.027*** 0.012 0.000
(0.011) (0.008) (0.019) (0.000)
Early childhood 3.613*** –1.587*** –2.852** 0.270***
 education and care (0.903) (0.564) (1.258) (0.024)
Constant 43.955*** 47.007*** 41.954*** 37.892*** 44.709*** 52.367*** 2.810*** 1.753***
(1.561) (2.016) (1.913) (2.497) (0.936) (1.144) (0.117) (0.057)
R2 0.914 0.921 0.931 0.944 0.943 0.967 0.718 0.692
Mean of dependent
 variable
54.8 55.1 20.6 21.0 23.4 23.7 1.9 1.7
Observations 1,026 667 1,026 667 545 340 1,325 806
Sample period 1970–2014 1970–2010 1970–2014 1970–2010 1970–2013 1970–2010 1970–2014 1970–2010
Number of countries 30 22 30 22 30 22 30 22
Notes and Sources: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include country and year 
effects.  The average payment rate is from the Max Planck Institute’s Comparative Family Policy Database 
(Gauthier 2011). It is computed as a weighted average of payment rates for maternity leave, parental 
leave, and childcare leave with weights given by the length of each leave type. The cash benefits are 
expressed as a percentage of the average female wage in manufacturing. See notes to Tables 1 and 2 
for all other variable definitions and sources. Percentage of total leave that is paid is the ratio of total 
paid leave available to mothers to maximum weeks of job-protected weeks (paid/unpaid) available to 
mothers.  
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Results reported in the first two columns confirm Ruhm’s (1998) findings of 
a nonmonotonic relationship between the duration of parental leave and female 
outcomes. In our case, however, this holds irrespective of whether the leave is paid, 
while Ruhm’s analysis focuses on paid leave. Our estimates in the full specification 
of column 2 imply that female employment rises with job-protected parental leave 
up to 50 weeks and declines thereafter. Quantitatively, however, this effect is small—
with a maximum 1.6 percentage point gain, corresponding to 3 percent of the 
sample average.10 If the United States—with currently 12 weeks of entitlement—
were to extend entitlement to 70 weeks as in Sweden, the corresponding gain in 
US female employment would be 1.4 percentage points. Conditional on the length 
of leave entitlements, female employment falls with the percentage of the total 
leave that is paid and the average replacement ratio, and rises with early childhood 
spending. Half a percentage point increase in early years spending (corresponding 
to roughly its standard deviation in this sample) is associated with a 1.8 percentage 
point increase in female employment. 
Column 3 of Table 3 shows results for the difference between male and female 
employment rates. Because this is a gender gap, it also takes into account the effects, 
if any, of parental leave on male employment rates. The coefficients on parental 
leave rights are smaller (in absolute value) than in column 1, which is consistent 
with a finding that male employment responds to the length of parental leave in the 
same direction as female employment, but with reduced magnitude. The estimated 
effect of parental leave becomes not significantly different from zero in column 
4, whose sample is restricted to the set of countries for which information on the 
replacement ratio is available. 
Columns 5 and 6 show results for earnings gaps, measured as gender differ-
ences in median log annual earnings for full-time workers, and thus encompassing 
differences in weeks worked as well as differences in weekly wages. Wage effects may 
in turn be driven by both a causal impact of policy on wages of those in employ-
ment, and the changing composition of employment along wage characteristics. 
The specification in column 5 shows evidence of closing earnings gaps during the 
first eight months of parental leave, but quantitatively this effect is tiny and not 
significantly different from zero. The impact of parental leave on the earnings gap 
becomes significant and sizeable in the specification of column 6. One possible 
explanation for the different results is that the results of column 6 are obtained 
after dropping from our working sample countries for which information on the 
replacement ratio is unavailable, and those countries happen to have systematically 
lower rates of union density than the rest of the countries.11 In other words, the 
10 Based on a specification of the relationship between employment and parental leave duration of the 
type: y = β1w − β2w2/100 , where y denotes employment rates and w denotes weeks of parental leave, 
the maximum employment effect is detected in correspondence of w = 50β1/β2 weeks, and it is equal 
to 25β21/β2.
11 Average union density in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Turkey is 21 percent (down to 12 percent excluding Iceland), against 31 percent in the other countries 
in our sample. 
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results of column 6 are obtained on a sample of countries with a lower average inci-
dence of binding union contracts than those of column 5, and may indicate a more 
sizeable wage response to policy in a context in which wages are relatively more 
flexible. Overall, coefficients on parental leave denote a stronger effect on earnings 
gaps in column 6 than on employment gaps in column 4, which implies that wage 
gaps are also closing for a wide range of parental leave durations. 
Column 6 also shows evidence of a relatively strong effect of early years spending 
on closing earnings gaps, which is larger than the corresponding effect on employ-
ment gaps in column 4. By the same logic, this implies that wage gaps are predicted 
to shrink with childhood spending. 
In columns 7 and 8, we show that the effect of parental leave on fertility is also 
nonmonotonic, but quantitatively this is negligible throughout, independent of the 
specification used, consistent with Shim’s (2014) finding that fertility decisions are 
not that responsive to parental leave unless leave is also adequately paid. Early child-
hood spending has a sizeable correlation with fertility, with one extra percentage 
point of GDP spending associated with 0.2 extra children per woman. The results 
are overall consistent with Adema, Ali, and Thévenon’s (2014) findings that public 
spending on family benefits and the duration of paid child-related leave for mothers 
is significantly associated with an increase in the total fertility rate. 
In Table 4, we consider heterogeneous policy effects by educational attain-
ment. The sample size is much smaller, due to more limited availability of outcome 
data, and to save on degrees of freedom we only report specifications based on the 
whole sample, which only control for parental leave entitlements. For simplicity 
we do not report regression results for employment gaps, and we cannot report 
results for fertility, as the fertility rate is only available for the overall population. 
Thus, the focus here is on female employment and earnings gaps. The notable 
result from these skill-specific regressions is that the beneficial effects of leave 
entitlement on female employment are mostly confined to less-skilled women, 
while high-skill women see their relative earnings fall as a consequence of longer 
entitlements. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that moderate job-protected leave enti-
tlements—up to about one year in our estimates—are associated with higher female 
employment while not having much correlation with fertility. However, beneficial 
effects are driven by the low-skill subsample, with possibly detrimental effects for 
the more educated. Longer and more generously paid entitlements may instead 
be detrimental for female employment at all skill levels. These effects are consis-
tent with a pattern of progressive labor market detachment during long periods of 
absence, potentially combined with negative feedback effects on employers’ beliefs 
about work attachment. For college-educated women, longer parental leave seems 
instead associated with wider earnings gaps. The returns to job-specific experience 
for this group is plausibly higher than for the less-skilled, and skilled women have 
more to lose from missed opportunities for career advancements. The one indicator 
that is across the board associated with more equal gender outcomes is spending in 
early childhood education and care. Presumably the availability of cheap substitutes 
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to maternal care encourages female labor supply, with positive, rather than nega-
tive, effects on the accumulation of actual experience. 
Micro-level Studies 
The micro-level approach aims to identify the causal impact of family poli-
cies on several labor market outcomes by focusing on specific country reforms and 
combining rich microdata—often social security records with detailed information 
on births, working hours, earnings, and leave take-up—and variation from natural 
experiments. In this section, we discuss available micro-level evidence on the impact 
of parental leave, subsidized child care, and in-work benefits. 
Maternity and Parental Leave 
A few decades ago, a major Austrian reform extended the duration of parental 
leave from one to two years for children born after July 1, 1990. Lalive and Zwei-
müller (2009) used the period before and after this time as a natural experiment 
for analyzing the effects of these changes in entitlement on fertility and mothers’ 
Table 4 
Family-Friendly Policies and Gender Gaps by Educational Attainment
Less than Upper 
Secondary
Upper Secondary, 
non- tertiary Tertiary
Female 
employment 
rate
Earnings 
gap
Female 
employment 
rate
Earnings 
gap
Female 
employment 
rate
Earnings 
gap
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Maximum weeks of 0.164** –0.112 0.097 0.062 –0.011 0.232**
 job-protected leave (0.083) (0.152) (0.060) (0.114) (0.046) (0.107)
Maximum weeks –0.171*** –0.257** –0.097* –0.122 –0.054* –0.138*
 squared/100 (0.059) (0.130) (0.054) (0.081) (0.030) (0.078)
Constant 47.872*** 62.487*** 63.132*** 50.854*** 79.560*** 39.626***
(3.274) (5.852) (2.013) (4.537) (1.736) (4.955)
R2 0.946 0.840 0.956 0.883 0.921 0.758
Mean of Dependent Variable 46.6 44.3 65.7 40.0 78.7 42.6
Observations 492 300 504 300 504 300
Sample period 1997–2013 1997–2013 1997–2013 1997–2013 1997–2013 1997–2013
Number of countries 30 29 30 29 30 29
Notes and Sources: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include country and year 
effects. In column (1) data for Japan are only available from 1997 to 2001. Iceland is excluded from the 
sample in columns (2), (4), and (6). See notes to Table 1, Table 2, and online Appendix Table A2 for 
variable definitions and data sources.
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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labor market outcomes. Based on variation across births on either side of policy 
introduction, the authors detect substantial fertility effects of leave extension, 
accounting for 12 additional children per 100 women. Extended leave also delays 
return to work of mothers, even after the benefits are exhausted, resulting in 
significant reductions in female employment and earnings during the first three 
years after birth, but only minor effects beyond three years. While fertility effects 
are stronger for women with below-median pre-birth earnings, the short-run 
reduction in earnings is larger for high-wage than for low-wage women. Later 
Austrian reforms of 1996 and 2000 shortened and extended, respectively, entitle-
ment to replacement benefits, leaving job-protected leave unchanged, and Lalive, 
Schlosser, Steihauer, and Zweimüller (2013) estimate that longer cash benefits 
significantly delay return to work of mothers when leave is job-protected, but less 
so once job protection has expired. 
Germany enacted five major expansions in maternity leave coverage between 
1979 and 1993, which led to gradual and staggered extensions in job-protected 
leave from 2 to 36 months and in the time of receipt for cash benefits from 2 
to 24 months. Schönberg and Ludsteck (2014) find that extension of coverage 
at short durations leads to small delays in return to work, and the extension of 
coverage at longer durations leads to larger delays, but it has almost no effect on 
employment rates and earnings for women more than three years after childbirth. 
However, extensions of cash benefits beyond the job protection period produce 
significant long-run employment and earnings losses for affected mothers, which 
suggest a role for job guarantees in avoiding long-lasting negative effects of benefit 
extensions.
Norway enacted a series of seven expansions in paid maternity leave, which 
nearly doubled from 18 weeks in 1977 to 35 weeks in 1992. Dahl, Løken, Mogstad, 
and Salvanes (2016), using a regression discontinuity approach based on timing 
of births, find that the paid leave expansion didn’t crowd out unpaid leave, 
thereby substantially expanding maternal time at home (and out of the labor 
market) in the months following birth, without a reduction in household income. 
Other than delaying the return to work, the reforms did not have a discernible 
impact on female labor supply in the long run, fertility, marriage, divorce, or 
children’s schooling outcomes. The authors also note that the extension in paid 
leave implied regressive transfers towards eligible women, who had systematically 
higher income than the noneligible, and hence conclude that available evidence 
on social benefits and redistribution may not support the case for extensions to 
maternity leave. 
In a 2007 reform, Germany linked maternity benefits to pre-birth income for 
up to 14 months after birth, thus raising the financial incentives to take-up parental 
leave for higher-earning women. This reform appears to have significantly delayed 
the return to work of affected mothers during the first year after birth but enhanced 
female employment in the medium run (Kluve and Tamm 2013). Medium-run 
employment gains however seem to be limited to part-time jobs, with no discern-
ible impact on full-time employment (Kluve and Schmitz 2014). Raute (2015) 
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investigates fertility effects of the 2007 German reform and finds sizeable fertility 
gains for women with above-median earnings and older women.12 
While most high-income countries currently have in place leave provisions for 
fathers, their relatively recent introduction, as well as their more limited take-up rate, 
imply that the evaluation of their effects on female outcomes is still in its infancy. 
Available evidence shows that the introduction of one month of exclusive paternity 
leave in Sweden in 1995 increased fathers’ time off work after birth while it did not 
alter fathers’ share of child care as measured by their take-up rate of leave for care 
of sick children (Eckberg, Eriksson, and Friebel 2013). Thus, to date, there is no 
evidence of beneficial impacts of paternity leave rights on mothers’ careers, but the 
recent extension of exclusive father’s leave in other European countries should lead 
to further evaluations of their impact on mothers’ labor market outcomes. 
Subsidized Child Care 
In several countries, parents returning to work after childbirth continue to 
receive state support in the form of subsidized or publicly provided child care 
and preschool programs. For the United States, Cascio and Schanzenbach (2013) 
evaluate the impact of the introduction of universal preschool for four year-olds 
in Oklahoma and Georgia since the 1990s, exploiting both state-level variation in 
policy adoption and age targets, and find only mild evidence for an impact of such 
programs on maternal labor supply. Despite a substantial increase in preschool 
enrollment among four year-olds, maternal employment gains are limited to the 
less-skilled and only during the first few years after the program is in place. Other 
studies have found that kindergarten increases maternal labor supply. Gelback 
(2002) uses quarter of birth as an instrument for when children enroll in kinder-
garten, based on the fact that many states determine kindergarten enrollment 
based on a child’s birthdate, and finds using data from the 1980 Census that child 
enrollment in kindergarten substantially raises weekly hours, annual weeks, and 
employment rates for single mothers, but less so for married mothers. Similar quali-
tative effects of kindergarten subsidies are documented by Cascio (2009), who looks 
at staggered patterns of state-level provision of subsidies to school districts providing 
kindergarten in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The Canadian province of Québec introduced childcare subsidies for four year-
olds in 1997, combined with wider availability and high quality of service. Lefebvre 
and Merrigan (2008) find a sizeable impact of this scheme on maternal outcomes of 
Québec mothers relative to other provinces, leading to 8 percentage points higher 
labor force participation and 231 extra annual hours. In follow-up work, Lefebvre, 
Merrigan, and Verstraete (2009) and Haeck, Lefebvre, and Merrigan (2015) find 
that these beneficial effects for mothers’ outcomes persist in the long run. 
12 The discussion here is not intended to be a comprehensive literature review. Some other studies include 
Geyer, Haan, and Wrohlich (2015) with an analysis of the employment effects of higher leave benefits in 
Germany and Asai (2015) for a similar study on Japan. Rossin-Slater, Ruhm, and Waldfogel (2013) find that 
the expansion of paid leave policy in California did not have a negative impact on employment.
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Norway undertook a large-scale expansion in subsidized public child care in 
1975. Havnes and Mogstad (2011) find that despite a high take-up rate, subsidies 
did not encourage maternal employment, as they largely crowded-out informal 
childcare arrangements. Similar conclusions for more recent years are drawn by 
Givord and Marbot (2015) for the French case, in which an average 50 percent 
subsidy to childcare spending introduced in 2004 only raised female participation 
by 1 percentage point. Bettendorf, Jongen, and Muller (2015) and Nollenberger 
and Rodríguez-Planas (2015) detect slightly stronger effects for the Netherlands 
and Spain, respectively.
Unsurprisingly, micro-level studies find relatively smaller effects of childcare 
subsidies in countries with relatively low childcare costs at baseline (like Norway and 
France) than in countries in which the cost of child care is higher (like the United 
States and Canada).
In-Work Benefits
By providing tax credits (mostly) to low-income workers with children, in-work 
benefits combine poverty alleviation with incentives to work. Brewer, Francesconi, 
Gregg, and Grogger (2009) and Blundell and Hoynes (2004) provide cross-national 
overviews on in-work benefits. 
Although these tax credits are not primarily targeted to female labor force 
participation, eligibility and take-up rates are higher among mothers than fathers. 
A large literature has examined the labor supply effects of the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) in the United States, most notably for single mothers. Nichols and 
Rothstein (2016) survey this literature and highlight a consensus around the size-
able positive effects of the EITC on the labor supply of single mothers, especially 
for the less-skilled, with most estimates ranging between 3 and 6 extra percentage 
points of participation (for example, Hotz and Scholz 2003). The effects of interest 
are mostly identified via an expansion of the EITC for multi-children households, 
or via state-level changes in the generosity of benefits. The estimated effects are 
quite different for married women: Eissa and Hoynes (2004) find evidence of small 
disincentive effects on the participation rate of married women, consistent with the 
fact that the EITC raises average taxation on the secondary earner’s earnings. Hotz 
and Scholz (2003), Nichols and Rothstein (2016), and references in those papers 
offer detailed discussion of the effects of the EITC on work, poverty, health, and 
family outcomes.
In the United Kingdom, the main in-work benefit is the Working Family Tax 
Credit, introduced in 1999, and its effects on the labor supply of various groups 
(most notably single mothers) were evaluated both via simulations based on struc-
tural models of labor supply (Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir 2000; Brewer, 
Duncan, Shepard, and Suarez 2006) and difference-in-differences models based on 
comparisons with married or cohabiting mothers and/or single women without 
kids (for example, Francesconi and van der Klaauw 2007; Gregg, Harkness, and 
Smith 2009). The consensus from this literature is that the WFTC raised the employ-
ment rate of lone mothers by 4–5 percentage points, although the interpretation of 
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difference-in-differences estimates may be complicated by the existence of trending 
differences in the labor force behavor of treatment and control groups, and the 
introduction of other welfare policies that were phased in at the same time as the 
WFTC, including the Childcare Credit and the New Deal for Lone Parents.
Overall, the available micro-level studies find beneficial effects of in-work bene-
fits on female employment, although these effects are typically sizeable only for 
single mothers.
Multiplier Effects 
While legislation on family policies typically defines eligible groups, based for 
example on age or cohort of children and/or family income, social interactions 
across peers may affect policy take-up as well as labor market outcomes beyond the 
targeted population. Failing to recognize such interdependencies (if any) has impli-
cations for the evaluation of policy interventions, as outcomes for control groups 
may be contaminated by interactions with the treatment group, and a comparison 
of outcomes between treatment and control groups would yield a downward-biased 
estimate of policy impact. 
Contamination from the treated to the nontreated population may result from 
sharing information about the characteristics and availability of a certain family 
policy, or learning about its effects on outcomes for one’s peers. Progress in the 
identification of these effects has been limited by well-known problems. There is the 
“reflection problem” of drawing an inference about how one group affects another, 
so-called because when two groups are changing at the same time—like your reflec-
tion changes in the mirror when you move—figuring out how one group affects 
the other is problematic (Manski 1993). Similar issues arise because of correlated 
unobservable characteristics, endogenous group membership, and the difficulties 
of observing peer groups in available data (Dahl, Løken, and Mogstad 2014). 
In Norway, after the introduction of one extra month of parental leave for fathers 
of children born after April 1, 1993, Dahl, Løken, and Mogstad (2014) sought to 
estimate peer effects in the take-up rate of parental leave. Before 1993, parents could 
share without restrictions a parental leave of given length, while the introduction of 
an exclusive “daddy month” was supposed to promote gender equality in the house-
hold. Taking advantage of the timing of the reform, the authors identify peer effects 
in the take-up rate of parental leave among both workplace and family networks using 
a regression discontinuity design. Their results show evidence of substantial peer 
effects in both networks, as co-workers and brothers of fathers induced to take-up 
leave by the reform became 10 and 15 percentage points more likely, respectively, to 
take paternity leave out of the (nonexclusive) parental quota. These effects—which 
are amplified over time—are interpreted as evidence of transmission of informa-
tion about costs and benefits of paternal leave, eventually leading to a redefinition 
of social norms about parents’ roles. Welteke and Wrohlich (2016) highlight similar 
spillover effects in the take-up rate of parental leave among mothers following the 
2007 German reform discussed above. Future research should continue looking for 
potential peer effects and network effects in other programs.
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Comparing Lessons from Macro and Micro Studies 
While both the macro and micro literatures tend to find overall positive effects 
of subsidized child care on female employment, the discussion above illustrates that 
no obvious consensus emerges from the literature that has studied the labor market 
impact of parental leave rights and benefits. Cross-country studies, with weaker iden-
tification, point to a positive correlation with maternal employment rates, albeit 
this effect is limited to short or intermediate leave durations, and mostly applies to 
less-skilled women, with virtually no impact for the more educated. Extremely long 
leave durations seem instead to have inhibitive effects. On the other hand, studies 
on microdata tend to find that parental leave mostly delays return to work, with no 
discernible effects on employment rates in the long run. 
Several factors may potentially explain such discrepancies. First, the beneficial 
impact of maternity leave may be overestimated in cross-country studies insofar as 
exogenous shocks to female labor force participation induce family-friendly legis-
lation via political support and/or changes in social norms towards gender roles. 
Second, Ruhm (1998) does detect positive effects of short-lived parental leave 
(around three months), and our more recent estimates find positive effects up to 
one year and negative effects afterwards, but widespread extensions to leave rights 
in most countries have inevitably shifted the focus of later studies based on micro-
data towards variations in parental leave at much longer durations, up to three 
years. Thus, it might be possible that the availability of some job protection, relative 
to no protection at all, would ensure continuity of employment and discourage tran-
sitions out of the labor market, while further extensions would simply delay return 
to work without further gains in employment. Third, cross-country studies often 
provide joint perspectives on various family-oriented policies, and Blau and Kahn 
(2013) find that parental leave has no significant impact on female participation 
once other policy instruments are controlled for. On the other hand, micro-level 
studies that compare employment outcomes for treated and nontreated parents 
may underestimate the impact of policy reforms if the behavior of treated parents 
induces changes in the behavior of the nontreated via learning, imitation, and other 
spillover mechanisms. 
Conclusions
What can we learn from the evolution of family policies across high-income 
economies? It is a complex tale in which changing economic, cultural, and polit-
ical economy considerations appear to shape (and be shaped by) these policies. No 
obvious consensus on the labor market impact of parental leave rights and benefits 
emerges from the empirical literature. Although there are some exceptions, it seems 
a fair summary that cross-country studies tend to find more positive effects on female 
employment than micro-level studies for relatively short leave durations, and more 
negative effects for longer entitlements. Employment and earnings impacts tend to 
be more beneficial for the less skilled, possibly with a detrimental impact on the 
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earnings of high-skill women. In a nutshell, there is little compelling evidence that 
extended parental leave rights have an overall positive effect on female outcomes.
The policies with the strongest evidence for reducing gender disparities seem 
to be early childhood spending (in both cross-country and microdata) and in-work 
benefits (in the microdata). A potential common theme here is that making it easier 
to be a working mother may matter more than the length of leave or the payments 
that new parents receive while out of the labor force. 
The United States has been an outlier in the adoption of family policies across 
high-income countries since the turn of the twentieth century. As Goldin and 
Mitchell argue in this symposium, the female labor force participation in the US 
has evolved into a pattern with very high rates of employment early in the life cycle, 
which then sharply decline with motherhood, which is being progressively delayed. 
The cross-country and micro-level evidence has not found an overall strong connec-
tion between maternity leave and female labor force participation. But the relatively 
short leave entitlements available to mothers in the United States may possibly 
contribute to this life-cycle pattern of delaying motherhood, with persistently low 
rates of labor force participation for women in their 30s and 40s. 
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